Category Archives: Entrepreneurship

Microsoft Accelerator Research on Starts and Closures in Indian tech startups

We are planning to release research findings every month week as part of our startup support program at the Microsoft Accelerator in India. There are about 50 different topics that we are curious about and are consistently doing research to find out ways to help our accelerator companies perform market research, target early adopters and focus on getting more customer traction.

This series is part of our accelerator database on engagement with startups, investors, mentors & entrepreneurship. Last week we did a report on Smartphone usage in India.

This week our focus is on the rate of companies starting and closing in the technology product space. Over the last few years Microsoft has been tracking new companies as part of its Bizspark program. Besides this we have access to several databases from multiple sources which has allowed us to consolidate all these into a single system to track startup activity. While we currently track over 73 different elements including founders, starts, closures, funding, etc. our focus is on trying to find patterns that can give us more clues to remove the roadblocks that reduce entrepreneurial failure early in the system.

We track over 6200+ entities – which includes services companies with a “product” they are building and also many viable side-projects, where the founder is generating some traction or revenue and 3900+ companies that are solely focused on building products (includes SaaS, eCommerce, traditional software, consumer Internet, etc.) in India.

On average there are about 450+ starts annually over the last 3 years, which has grown dramatically thanks to eCommerce.

While Bangalore has the most number of technology product startups overall, at neary 40%, Delhi/NCR came a close second in 2011, only to return to normalcy in 2012.

In terms of closure, 26% of companies still close within a year of them starting (either the founders giving up and moving on, or the company going dormant).

The biggest issue for closure (given that nearly 80%+ of all companies are bootstrapped) is collecting money from customers who have committed to paying for their usage of the product.

While not being able to raise funds is really #1, that seems to be a generic reason enough and a motherhood-and-apple-pie situation.

Unlike the valley (anecdotal information alone) most failed entrepreneurs dont go on to start another company or join a startup, but instead go to work at a much larger company (over 60%). Most reasons given were because of loans to payoff or pressure from parents (surprisingly not from any others).

Our recommendations are for new entrepreneurs to have a “cushion” of nearly 18 months in funds in their personal capacity before they delve into a new venture as opposed to 6 months.

We also recommend asking new customers for an advance in payment as part of the Proof of Concept instead of payment after the fact to aid in managing cash-flow more effectively.

Why it is a LOT easier to raise seed money for your startup in India than silicon valley right now

If you are an Indian entrepreneur who is looking to raise seed funding for your startup do it now. There’s been no better time to raise money for technology product startups than this year and possibly part of next year.

I understand the issues entrepreneurs face with Indian investors in the seed & early stage. They take too much time to make a decision, they ask for too much of your company and wont fund anything pre-revenue.

There are 3 major trends that are making it easier to raise capital now than any other time.

1. The number of accelerators has grown tremendously over the last year. There are 30+ privately funded (6+ in Bangalore alone), for profit entities, who are all keen to add bigger batch sizes to their portfolio.

2. Many Venture capitalists, stung by criticism that they are not taking enough risk and are not early adopters are eager to engage with startups earlier in their evolution, and are tweaking their investment thesis to add a few more pre-revenue and pre-product stage companies to their mix.

3. Angel networks, seeing over 15+ VC’s raising over $100+ million funds to focus on India, are signing up new angel investors in droves, and expanding their footprint. 2 years ago only 3 large angel networks existed in India. Today there are 15, and each of them has over 25 angel investors and some have over 150.

Seed stage of the Indian startup ecosystem has never had so many things working for it in confluence.

The demand side of the equation is fairly consistent. Our database indicates that after the eCommerce boom of 2010 and 2011, this year has seen a modest fall in new product startups being formed, from over 700 to little over 600, which means fewer companies chasing more investment options.

Now, lets look at the valley.

1. There has been a boom in new product startups, and the competition is fierce. The number of new startups has increased from over 1700 per year in the valley alone to over 3000. As I mentioned in an earlier post, VC’s are seeing nearly 150+ companies in the SaaS market, each of whom are doing more than $1 Million in revenue. There are 2 times as many companies fighting in the valley for the same quantum of funds.

2. Venture investors, seeing the boom in the seed stage and seeing also far fewer exits are adopting a wait and see approach to series A.

3. The VC freeze on series A in the valley has led to many sapling round investments from seed and micro VC’s and super angels, who are increasingly picking and choosing the companies they put seed money in for an extension round or “sapling round”.

If you are an entrepreneur, raise your seed round NOW. Things will get more “sane” by June next year and there will be many who start to take a more cautious approach to seed stage investments.

The equation on series B in India, is not as rosy though.

Funding for eCommerce companies, many of whom raised series A at HUGE valuations last year has pretty much dried up. Most companies are doing inside series B rounds (from their existing investors) and 3 of the  CEO’s I spoke with claimed down-rounds (where valuation of this round is lower than the previous round).

Microsoft Accelerator Research on Smartphone usage in India

We are planning to release research findings every month as part of our startup support program at the Microsoft Accelerator in India.. There are about 50 different topics that we are curious about and are consistently doing research to find out ways to help our accelerator companies perform market research, target early adopters and focus on getting more customer traction.

This series is part of our accelerator database on engagement with startups, investors, mentors & entrepreneurship.

The first research today that we are sharing is based on survey of mobile phone usage in India. Specifically we wanted to focus on smartphones and the adoption of apps on the smartphones.

There were 3 important questions some of our startups that are building mobile applications had, which we wanted to find answers for.

1. Who are the early adopters of mobile applications on smartphones? By age, gender, type of phone & OS.

2. What types of apps get quicker adoption than others? Games vs. social and Connected vs. standalone apps.

3. What is the usage of mobile web among smartphone users?

There are 3 most surprising answers are:

1. Older people (>35) make up 40+% of smart phone users. Used phones make up 18% overall and nearly 25% of smaller city users.

2. While Blackberry is still strong among older users, Samsung has the most number of touch screen and smartphone users overall, followed by a wide range of local brands.

3. The awareness of apps among both younger and older audiences is miserably low. <27% have EVER downloaded an app in India. Over 33% overall and 44% of older users have no data plan.

What does this mean for app developers in India?

1) Like worldwide stats, games trumps productivity and other apps on the mobile. But if you have a game that requires a data plan you are in trouble. So for game makers, the ability to make money from “ads” that are served via a mobile ad server is limited

2. Given that a lot of users are buying used (second-hand) phones in India, expect to support older models for a significant amount of time.

3. Given very little awareness of “apps” among Indian smartphone users, look for offline mechanisms (kiosks) to pop up to support app distribution.

P.S. Some of the slides have not rendered properly on Slideshare even after 2 attempts, so, here is a pdf version. Smartphone usage in India.

Indian Accelerators are from Mars and startups are from Venus

Yesterday I was at the AngelPad demo day, invited by my friend Thomas. 12 companies presented their products & traction in a breezy 3 to 3.5 minutes per startup. Overall, super high quality of presentations and a great set of companies.

Some initial impressions.

1. Each had 12-15 slides, crisp transitions and a really good flow to their presentations. Most 90%+ teams were 2 founders, but only 1 person presented when another was standing at the front with the co founder.

2. No live demos, and the pitches had a consistent flow to them. A one sentence “what we do”, a good description of the problem and some market stats, sizing. Some even had screen shots of their product.

3. It was a packed house and I had a chance to meet (and reconnect with) over 60+ investors. Most of the investors were impressed with the presentations and also with some of the ideas themselves.

I also had a chance to meet with 9 of the 12 founders. They had really excellent follow-through and I got 7 emails this morning to schedule time for follow ups to discuss their fundraising.

I also got to ask them what they really liked about the program, the schedule and the help Angelpad provided.

Many stated Thomas’s personal involvement and his passion to help companies first. They were so happy to have his time and guidance, that they had felt privileged to have him as their mentor.

A few of them mentioned the location and some of the other mentors as the second best thing in the program, followed by the group of other startups that were in the same batch as them. They felt they were truly motivated by the other teams and a sense of camaraderie was obvious.

As part of the Microsoft accelerator we have reached out to 28 accelerators in India over the last few weeks to get everyone together for a day of best practices and sharing. The event itself is a closed door, 1 day session at Bangalore, and over 20 of them have committed to being here. Our intention was to understand how other accelerators viewed success so we can help figure out our engagement with them and startups overall.

We get many questions about our accelerator and the top one is why we don’t give startups money.

In speaking to entrepreneurs, investors and other accelerators in the US, the TOP item they felt startups need is mentorship and advice to get many things right.

In my small sample of Angelpad startups they seeme to value the same thing.

In India, most (not all) startups only value money. Its a small amount really, ($10 – $25K), but somehow that small amount seems to indicate a sense of “skin in the game”.

I can totally understand that, but for an accelerator such as ours, that small amount does not really make us committed to the startups any more than without the money.

Second, the angel networks and investors in our mentor program don’t like the fact that Microsoft puts money in at the early stage, which creates a perverse incentive for us to “get a return from our investment”.

Third it creates an issue for other strategic investors (such as Qualcomm, which has looked at one of our companies for an investment) and venture investors, who prefer clean capitalization tables.

Unlike other accelerators which are not a corporate program, the key value to Microsoft from our program is startup engagement. We take pride in engaging with the startups and are extremely happy if they are successful, but the financial return from our investment is going to be largely negligible to us. Even if 1 of the 11 startups “makes it big” and we owned 6-10% of the company when it went IPO or got acquired, it would not be a significant dent to Microsoft by any means.

I understand why most Indian startups don’t value mentorship, the space, free food, customer traction, marketing planning, PR with blogs & press, full time design help and credits on technology platform.

I have learned from Angelpad that our primary motivation should be to ensure the next batch of companies value those things more than an investment of $10K to $20K.

I understand the bar is much higher to provide mentorship to the same level as Thomas, but that’s the goal we are aiming for.

The right time to launch your product

In my 14 years of developing and launching products, I have launched early, late and at “just the right time”. Truth is there is no “right time” if you have been working with customers and getting feedback. At that point the launch event tends to be largely a PR & AR (Press, Analysts & Bloggers) communication and outreach effort to create awareness, feel good about the traffic over the next few hours and get back to work.

Thanks to accelerators and the 3-4 month programs, almost every startup “launches” during demo day. To investors at least.

Since they want to launch “to investors” with some good momentum and traction, most startups are doing a soft launch or private beta a few weeks / months before and getting users and customers and some form of usage so they can show that traction to the investors.

I got a question about when to launch yesterday from an entrepreneur in Seattle. He’s been working on a consumer travel app and they have about 200+ active users that have been using the solution for the last 3 months. The beta criteria they kept for themselves (besides removing all the bugs) was active usage once a week by at least 10% of their registered users.

I ended up having a conversation of the pros and cons of launching early versus late. While I am fan of the “launch early and often” approach, I am also very aware of the problems of launching early, especially in a mature market such as the US. It tips of potential competitors who have a chance to be an better fast follower, that executes better given the lessons they can learn from the first mover.

Launch late and you will invariably get lots of people comparing you to the first mover and asking for features (right or wrong) that are already available with the competitor, making your ever so slight difference in the product strategy seem like an afterthought.

The easiest part of the conversation was my experience stated that the “Launch for investors” was the worst thing to do. Even if that’s your goal – to raise awareness so you can raise money, launching to the public the same day you do your demo day makes no sense, unless your product is aimed at investors.

Lets define launch of your company & product as the time you believe the product you are building is ready to be showcased so more people can be made aware of it. Its the equivalent of putting up the “Ready for business” sign outside your new restaurant.

Lets define purpose of the launch to be solely to focus on growing your users, customers and usage. Not to get feedback and tweak your beta product (which you should have done earlier), but to attract more potential users to your product.

There are 3 main strategies I have used to time the launch:

1. Time it around a startup event or conference (like Unpluggd coming up this weekend or Demo, TC Disrupt, etc.), so you can leverage the press, investor and influencer gathering to get most bang for the buck.

2. Launch it around an industry event (such as NRF in Jan for retail apps, or NASSCOM product conclave), which gives your more visibility among potential customers.

3. Launch independent of all dates and create momentum by reaching out to the press separately. This is fairly risky because you cant quite predict what else would happen on that day that might “steal the thunder” giving you less visibility than desired.

Regardless of the date, you still want to launch when your product is ready and your app is truly available to take more customers.

How to B2B is morphing into B2A, B2D, B2M

From the broadly 2 types of companies, those that focus on consumers (B2C) and those that focus on businesses / enterprises (B2B) there is an explosion of new types. While most of the new types are still a subset of B2B or B2C, the increasing sub segmentation of B2B is creating multiple niches among those trying to sell to the “enterprise”.

The problems with B2B are fairly well documented – Long & slow sales cycles, multiple decision makers with largely different agendas (procurement wants it cheap, CIO wants it to fit into their technology stack and end users want it to be usable).

There are a 2 very interesting articles over the weekend from Dave McClure and Christina Cordova  which document the changed landscape in B2C. What I am seeing among our startups in the Accelerator is consistent with what Christina mentions in addition to the initial problem with most mobile consumer startups – which is getting users.

Essentially the marketing mechanisms (ads, PR, email) create a lot more friction to getting users to try / download the mobile app versus the web app.

So you have to primarily use a combination of reviews, recommendations or in-app ads to get users.

What’s happening on the B2B front is even more interesting.

B2B is morphing into B2D (developers), B2A (Architects, as an example) or B2M (Marketers).

Thanks to SaaS and Cloud pay-as-you-go services, the products are inexpensive enough to get enterprise segments without the hassles of going through the entire Purchase order process for many products.

So most B2B companies are targeting a specific user who is also the person to approve, buy and select the product / service that works for them.

The implications are obviously dramatic and ones that change the landscape completely.

In a follow on post I’ll document the ways this changes the marketing and sales techniques.

How do you measure the success of an accelerator?

Since joining and running the Microsoft Accelerator for the last 2 months, I thought I’d take some time to follow up on what I learned in my first month running an accelerator with a question to understand how to measure success.

There are, in our internal tracking list over 100 incubators and accelerators in India, over 75% of which are run by colleges and educational institutions. Of the 30+ for profit, private accelerators and seed fund / incubators, nearly 25 of them provide space, initial funding and mentorship.

Over the last few months I tried to get a sense for what constitutes success at an accelerator.

The prevailing wisdom seems to be that the only metric accelerators should be measured by is to create companies that are “fundable”. This implies that accelerators and seed fund / incubators should only look to fund teams and companies that have a good chance of getting follow-on funding.

That’s also the #1 metric even the entrepreneurs at our accelerator judge us by. A few weeks ago CNBC did a 11 min video interview of our current batch and the only thing that came from each and every entrepreneur was the amount of money they wanted to raise at the end of the batch.

Update: From a few email’s I got from some of the founders at our accelerator, who said that they were asked by CNBC to only focus on the funding part during their interview.

The problem with this measurement is that it focuses the selection process to be a lot more risk averse and less open to risky and unproven teams. Since many in the industry claim VC’s are becoming more risk averse, who then takes the risk to develop entrepreneurs who are young and inexperienced?

On the other hand, I do understand many accelerators have raised capital and have a fiduciary responsibility to return multiple-fold that money to their investors. Which is why we continue to see copy-cat models which have a standard $10K – $25K in investment and a 6-10% of the company in exchange. The model is based on a spray and pray approach to look for 1-2 “winners” in a batch of  10 companies.

Which leads me to conclude that only funding should not be the metric that you judge accelerators by, but if that’s not the only metric, what else is measurable?

Lets quickly look at what accelerators provide. Space, Mentors, a set of graduates from previous batches, a Demo day, and some amenities (food, etc.) and a demo day to meet investors.

Almost every accelerator has about 20-50 mentors who help the portfolio companies. From a quick glance of their websites, nearly 20 of the 200+ mentors appears on all websites. So none of the accelerators can really claim “we have the best mentors”. In fact most good mentors I know help more than one accelerator.

There is one difference though: Product mentors are rare in India and very few have a person (or set of people) to help you think through building something that’s needed by customers or users.

Space (desks, etc.) offered by most accelerators tends to be largely the same, and while there are some exceptional spaces, most entrepreneurs wont really judge the accelerator by the quality of the space.Same goes for amenities. Although we provide free food for all at the Microsoft accelerator, that’s largely a nice to have.

Previous batch founders and other companies funded before also help a lot, but they tend to be as good or as bad as the selection process setup initially. Furthermore, since many accelerators and seed funds were experimenting their models earlier, many of the previous batches were largely work-in-progress.

So then we are back to the demo day and investor connections.

Which is why we built an early adopter network and system to ensure that entrepreneurs have access to the first few marquee customers that they need (who will pay as well) to ensure they are building something someone needs and is willing to pay for.

Hands-on design, architecture, marketing, PR (making connections with reporters) and sales are other things we are providing to ensure traction before their seed round.

The question is how do you measure the value of these items and more importantly the impact of these on the startup’s future?

Why you should not outsource your initial sales efforts

Most technical founders are not comfortable with the sales process or the disciple of selling. They tend to treat it as beneath themselves and “sleazy”. Given that most entrepreneurs I interact with are engineers, I usually walk them through an engineer’s approach towards selling, which tends to mirror the agile development process they are familiar with (more about this in a later post).

Many entrepreneurs do try to sell, and not seeing quick success, come to a conclusion that they should outsource their sales efforts to an “expert”. Usually this is after they have exhausted their initial contacts and get frustrated with the constant rejection that comes with sales, or after they have finished tapping into their entire list of first level contacts who could possibly be a customer. They tend to be more comfortable “convincing” people they know well rather than “selling” to people they dont know at all. Which is why I ask them to “dig their well before they are thirsty“.

Without sales there is no business.

Without sales there are no customers. No customers means what you are building is a side project.

Without sales there is no revenue. No revenue means what you are working on is an unsustainable venture.

I have heard of enough companies who have died because they could not sell, but rarely heard of companies that died because they could not develop or build a solution that was sold.

To me, sales is the headlights to your business. I would never recommend outsourcing your sales function in your startup.

Even large companies I know in other areas besides technology, outsource manufacturing, engineering, finance or customer service, but rarely outsource sales or marketing.

I dont consider selling via channel partners as outsourcing your sales. That usually means you have to “sell” and convince your channel partners.

There are 3 reasons why I dont like sales outsourcing.

1. You dont “own” the customer and dont get direct customer feedback. In the initial days of your startup, its absolutely important to have direct customer connections, feedback and input. Even after you grow larger, customer connections are the biggest source of innovative ideas. Without direct customer access you will get a warped view of the real problems and pain points they have, which results in a sub optimal solution.

2. It is very hard to predict predict consistent closure of deals and commit to financial milestones. When you outsource sales, the outsourced company has the eyes and ears on the ground to understand what moves deals, whose budgets are cut and when deals might happen. That information is critical for you to plan your quarterly projections. Without that information you will also find it hard to understand how to allocate resource towards projects and features the engineering team should be working on.

3. Even if sales is “outsourced” most outsourcing vendors will require your help to constantly tweak your positioning, handle customer objections, change pricing, etc. Even after 5+ years at a large software company with over 500+ in a direct sales function, I found us to be constantly changing messaging and positioning each quarter to keep up with customer trends.

Can some parts of the sales process (like the initial lead generation) be outsourced instead of the entire sale process? Possibly. If you feel that the biggest challenge for you is to get the initial meetings and you get a sense that after your get those appointments you are able to move the sales process forward, then I would suggest you look to getting help from a firm that sets up appointments, or does targeted lead generation.

Why do companies buy anything from B2B startups?

Yesterday I had a chance to talk with a software entrepreneur who has built a security product that’s primarily sold to mid-sized and larger companies. Over 8 months have gone into the development and he has been able to get fewer than 5 customers for the product. Surprisingly he’s been able to get enough interest from investors who have provided early funding to the tune of several hundreds of thousands of dollars. He has been able to also generate lots of interest from partners but that has not translated into customer sales. Given his developer  background, he was keen to talk about sales and how to generate some initial traction in the market.

Here is what I have learned from all my initial startup selling in the B2B space (i.e. startups selling anything – software, hardware, services, juice bars, etc. to other companies, not consumers).

There are only 2 reasons why companies buy from startups – The person buying has a very good relationship with the entrepreneur, or the person buying has a dying pain that she feels can be solved by the startup’s solution.

That’s it.

This is dramatically different from why they buy from Cisco, Office Depot or any other large company – where politics, budgets, executive management preferences or any other of over 100 factors also come into play.

Lets drill down into both those reasons.

I have personally only been able to sell the first 10 or so first customers for all my software companies through relationships that I built earlier. Which is why I always advocate digging you well before you are thirsty. Most of the software that I have built (B2B) did solve a problem, but I found that it was never an “immensely-horrible, I’ll-die-if-I-dont-fix-it” kinda pain. I avoided those because I did not have as much confidence in my ability to solve that type of problem since the scrutiny & pressure of “must-work-or-you’re-dead or this-better-work-or-you’re-out” causes buggy software.

So I focused on building relationships with key people (that usually took a few months), without me talking much about my product or service. It was purely to help the other person who I wanted to be friends with.

When you build a strong relationship, you will find people are more willing to forgive bugs, try unproven software or even give a no-name startup a chance.

Given my engineering background, I have a “formula” that I believe that will help you understand relationship building.

Relationships = Time + Trust + Mutual interest.

In this case, + is not addition, but an operator. More about this formula in a later post, but the summary is building a relationship takes time (quality not quantity) spent together, building trust by small commitments you deliver on and mutual interests you share with the other person.

The only other reason larger companies buy from small startups is that they are in a huge pain and they believe startup has a unique solution, offering or product to solve that pain in the fastest possible time. I emphasize “they believe” because they are really not sure yet since they have not built a relationship with that individual.

Relationships trump everything in sales. Everything. She who has the relationship wins.

Which is why you are better off getting a referral from one of your customers (who you have a good relationship with presumably) to another potential prospect (who they have a good relationship with).

So before you start you own B2B entrepreneurial venture, build relationships.

“Wasted nearly a year evaluating different markets” for a billion $ outcome at Meraki

Today Meraki announced its acquisition by Cisco. Doug Leone has a great post up. You have to read it in its entirety, but here’s the money quote.

The biggest challenge came early on in deciding where to aim the product. We wasted nearly a year evaluating different markets: entrepreneurial building owners, ad-supported Wi-Fi, retail, SMEs, large corporations, even the developing world. We eventually settled on SME, for product fit and speed of revenues. From there Meraki took off.\

They built a world class product, with a crack team from MIT and still “wasted” a year on getting to the right market. For a $Billion+ exit.